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Abstract 
Executive function impairments associated with unipolar depression contribute heavily to 
the individual and societal costs of this disorder. Unfortunately, past research on executive 
function deficits in unipolar depression has not succeeded in providing much detail about the 
nature of these deficits. Most researchers have used univariate methods to attempt to discern 
unique patterns of executive function deficits that characterize unipolar depression. To enhance 
specificity of prediction, the present study used Descriptive Discriminant Analysis, along with an 
ecologically valid measure of executive function, to reveal a pattern of executive function 
impairments specifically associated with unipolar depression, including impairments in 
emotional control, shifting, and planning and organizing. Though each of these deficits predicted 
current disability, only deficits in emotional control did so after accounting for current depressive 
and anxious symptoms. Regression analyses also revealed complex relationships between 
symptoms and executive function deficits in each of three clinical groups (currently depressed, 
previously depressed, and currently anxious), indicating that although some executive function 
deficits may resolve as symptoms abate, emotional control may be a more stable predictor of 
general affective psychopathology (e.g., both anxiety and depression).  
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Introduction 
Globally, unipolar depression is not only a highly prevalent but also a highly disabling, 
and therefore costly, condition. For the past 20 years, World Health Organization (WHO) 
estimates have indicated that depressive disorders are the leading cause of disability in the 
world (World Health Organization, 2002). Unipolar depression, specifically, is the fourth 
leading cause of the global burden of disease, surpassed only by perinatal complications, 
chronic respiratory infection, and HIV/AIDs in terms of its worldwide cost to individuals, 
governments, and society (Mathers, & Murray, 2004; Ustun, Aysuo-Mateos, Chatterji; World 
Health Organization, 2002). 
In developed regions, where depression accounts for as much as 22% of years of life lost 
to disability, the costs are even higher (Murray & Lopez, 1997). In Europe, the financial burden 
of depression now equals approximately 1% of the entire European economy, with more than 
half of that estimate attributed to the indirect costs of lost productivity, morbidity, and mortality 
(Sobocki, Johnsson, Angst, & Rehnberg, 2006). In the United Sates, depression is estimated to 
cost US employers almost $51.5 billion per year (Greenberg, Kessler, Birbaum, Leong, Lowe, 
Berglund, & Corey-Lisle, 2003), due in large part to so-called “presenteeism,” or lost 
productive time at work (Stewart, Ricci, Chee, Hahn, & Morganstein, 2003). Indeed, when 
compared to employees with other chronic medical conditions, depressed workers report 
significantly more difficulty sustaining concentration and focus, as well as more impaired work 
quality, efficiency, and speed (Wang, Beck, Berglund, McKenas, Pronk, Simon, & Kessler, 
2004). Thus, while depression is frequently characterized as a disorder of emotion or mood, the 
cognitive impairments associated with depression may be the more functionally and 
economically significant features of the disorder. However, despite decades of research the 
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pattern of cognitive impairment in depression is far from understood and appears to be 
dependent upon a number of factors, including the frequency of depressive episodes, co-
morbidty (especially co-morbid anxiety and co-morbid medical conditions), severity of current 
symptoms, depression sub-type, age, gender, and history of treatment (for reviews, see Hammar 
& Ardal, 2009; Levin et al., 2007). 
Cognitive Impairment Versus Executive Function Impairment 
Despite use of the term “cognitive impairment,” in reality the workplace and 
epidemiological studies referenced above refer almost exclusively to deficits in executive 
functions (e.g., inhibiting distraction, task-completion, error-monitoring, shifting between tasks, 
etc.). Indeed, in the literature to date “cognitive impairment” has often been used as a blanket 
term that includes abilities and skills typically characterized as “executive functions” in 
neuropsychological and cognitive neuroscience disciplines. However, using cognitive 
impairment and executive function impairment interchangeably can obscure important 
differences between the two (see the definition of executive function, below). Therefore, in the 
present study cognitive impairment and executive function impairment were assumed to be 
distinct, though interrelated, constructs. Importantly, only executive functions were measured in 
the present study.  
Cognitive and Executive Function Impairments in Unipolar Depression 
 Many researchers have posited that, like dementia and schizophrenia, unipolar depression 
is defined by profuse and often lasting impairments in a variety of cognitive ability domains 
(Austin et al., 1992). Indeed, the impairment may extend to executive functions as well, though, 
because they have been shown to be unrelated to the severity of current depressive symptoms, 
some have contended that these deficits are epiphenomenal (Porter, 2003). However, as Porter 
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conceded, it is also possible that executive function deficits are a stable marker of unipolar 
depression because they are unrelated to depression severity and are detectable during (and 
perhaps even after) depressive episodes in people of all ages, severities, and subtypes (Purcell, 
Maruff, Kyrios, & Pantelis, 1997; Tarbuck & Paykel, 1995) and even in those who are merely 
dysphoric (Channon, 1996). Thus, an alternative interpretation of the same results would contend 
that, because memory and learning impairments (e.g., cognitive impairments) fluctuate, they may 
be unrelated to unipolar depression specifically and instead represent epiphenomena that arise 
from combinations of illness severity and other individual characteristics (described forthwith). 
Indeed, though early research suggested that severe cognitive impairments characterized unipolar 
depression, subsequent investigations have largely indicated that those effects were due to the 
following: depression subtype (with psychotic depression demonstrating impairments on par 
with schizophrenia; Basso & Bornstein, 1999; Jest et al., 1993; Schatzberg, 2000); age (no major 
cognitive impairment in the young, Fossati, Amar, Raoux, Ergis, & Allilaire, 1999; Grant, Thase, 
& Sweeney, 2001; only elderly show impaired processing, Beats, Sahakian, & Levy, 1996; 
Tarbuck & Payel, 1995); medication use (SSRI’s impair verbal learning; Schmitt et al., 2001); 
inpatient status/severity (Austin, 1999; Burt, Zembar, & Niederehe, 1995; Veiel, 1997); and co-
morbid medical (Hickie & Scott, 1998; Kramer-Ginsberg et al., 1999) and psychological (Basso 
et al., 2007; Castaneda et al., 2008) conditions. 
As with cognitive impairment, disagreement about the existence, nature, and course of 
executive function impairments in unipolar depression are numerous. A substantial body of 
research has demonstrated executive function deficits in updating, shifting, and cognitive 
inhibition within episodes of unipolar depression (Clark, Sarna, & Goodwin, 2005; Gohier et al., 
2009; Harvey et al., 2004; Micco, et al., 2009; Ottowitz, Dougherty, & Savage, 2002), but there 
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is also evidence suggesting that executive function deficits in depression, like general cognitive 
impairment, are largely a product of age and its concomitant reduction of psychomotor speed 
(Lockwood, Alexopoulos, & van Gorp, 2002) . The absence of executive function deficits in 
depressed children (Favre et al., 2009) and in children of parents with mood and anxiety 
disorders (who thus have a heightened risk of developing these problems; Micco et al., 2009) 
casts further doubt on the universality of executive function deficits in the disorder. 
Some authors assert that depression-related executive function deficits (particularly in 
shifting) remain after recovery and predict worse outcome (Paradiso, Lamberty, Garvey, & 
Robinson, 1997), while others disagree, citing naturalistic studies showing roughly normal 
executive function and processing speed in formerly depressed persons following successful 
treatment (Gualtieri, Johnson, & Benedict, 2006). Indeed, post-treatment recovery of executive 
functions has been shown to persist through a 2-year follow-up, even in patients with recurrent 
unipolar depression, and has been demonstrated to be significantly associated with reductions in 
depressive symptoms (Biringer et al., 2005). 
Combining cognitive-vulnerability theories of depression with the above evidence suggesting 
“state”-dependent impairment, others have advanced the theory that executive function deficits 
in depression are, in fact, caused by suboptimal cognitive strategies, like rumination, that 
characterize the disorder. Indeed, several authors have experimentally demonstrated that 
rumination can elicit the executive function deficits frequently observed in depression. In a study 
of induced rumination and induced distraction, rumination was shown to decrease random 
number generation in depressed patients. Importantly, when rumination was prevented by 
distraction, depressed patients and controls were equivalent in their levels of both rumination and 
random number generation (Watkins & Brown, 2002). Similarly, in a study of attention 
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allocation, depressed patients were observed to perform poorly only in high-interference 
conditions, and this deficit was highly associated with rumination (Levens, Muhtadie, & Gotlib, 
2009). This, too, suggests that the executive function deficits seen in depression may be dynamic 
and, at the very least, co-vary with depression-typical cognitive strategies. However, a follow up-
study examining the effect of rumination on cognitive flexibility and inhibition in the Stroop task 
revealed a general deficit in flexibility that was more pronounced following rumination but still 
present across conditions in dysphoric (e.g., highly symptomatic, but not necessarily meeting full 
criteria for a current major depressive episode) young adults (Philippot & Brutoux, 2008). 
In sum, after reviewing the literature one can confidently conclude only that some 
depressed individuals exhibit some executive function deficits at least some of the time, which, 
given the enormity of the cost these deficits engender through disability, is hardly reassuring. 
Interestingly, an alternative approach, advanced by Ravnkilde et al. (2002), is to accept this 
ambiguity at face value and concede that the lack of any consistent pattern of executive function 
deficits within unipolar depression indicates the need for sophisticated subgroup analysis. The 
expediency of this suggestion notwithstanding, it unfortunately fails to explain why no consistent 
patterns of executive function deficits have emerged from the study of even well-defined 
subgroups. However, although some investigators have used very sophisticated designs and 
group selection procedures, their approaches have been limited by one or more of the following: 
ignoring the effects of anxiety, ignoring severity of current symptoms, ignoring other 
neuropsychological findings, forgoing more ecologically valid measures of executive function 
for laboratory tests, and using a non-multivariate approach to compare individual executive 
functions across groups. Each of these issues will be discussed below. 
Anxiety Disorders 
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Although the purpose of the present study was to examine executive function deficits in 
unipolar major depression, depression and anxiety disorders are highly co-morbid (Kessler et al., 
2003), and both are characterized by high levels of negative affect. Thus, isolating the “pure” 
effects of one disorder inherently requires isolating and measuring the effects of the other (Clark 
& Watson, 1991; Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998). Unfortunately, executive function deficits in 
anxiety disorders have been relatively less well studied. Comparing adults with any anxiety 
disorder to those without, Airaksinen and colleagues found evidence for impairment in shifting 
but not verbal fluency or processing speed, primarily in those with Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder and Panic Disorder (Airaksinen, Larsson, & Forsell, 2005). Additionally, individuals 
with a sole diagnosis of General Anxiety Disorder or Specific Phobia showed no appreciable 
executive function deficits. However, co-morbid depression and alcohol disorders within that 
sample render the results somewhat difficult to interpret, though others have replicated these 
negative findings (Asmundson, Stein, Larsen, & Walker, 1994; Gladsjo et al., 1998). Other 
authors have posited that the executive function deficits and psychomotor slowing frequently 
observed in depression are actually due to the presence of an anxiety disorder, whereas pure 
depressed individuals show only memory impairment (Basso et al., 2007). In sum, these data 
indicate that concurrent measurement of anxiety is essential to identifying a pattern of executive 
function deficits that uniquely characterizes unipolar depression. Additionally, no study to date 
has compared depressed, previously depressed, and purely anxious groups’ executive functions 
in a manner that accounts for the high co-morbidity between anxiety and depression. Thus, the 
present study represents a significant improvement over previous designs in terms of its ability to 
disentangle a pattern of executive function deficits specific to (pure) unipolar major depression. 
Severity and Current Symptoms 
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As noted above, illness severity has frequently been associated with greater impairment 
(Austin, 1999; Burt, Zembar, & Niederehe, 1995; Veiel, 1997). Thus, in the present study 
measures of anxious and depressive symptoms were used to assess the effect of symptom 
severity on executive functions. 
Other Neuropsychological Findings 
A large body of evidence from lesion and stroke patients has demonstrated that the right 
parietal area of the brain is necessary not only for the recognition of emotional stimuli (Adolphs, 
Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1996; Borod, Koff, Lorch, & Nichols, 1986) but also for the 
regulation of arousal in response to emotional stimuli (Schrandt, Tranel, & Damasio, 1989). 
Synthesizing this information with models of frontal brain regions’ involvement in emotional 
experience, Heller (1993) proposed a model of emotional function whereby the frontal areas of 
the brain are involved in modulating emotional valence and the right posterior brain is involved 
in processing emotional information and mediating autonomic arousal. Predictions regarding 
activity and under-activity of the right parietal regions in various forms of psychopathology 
directly follow from this model and have received considerable support. 
Although not perfectly correlated with brain activity (Green, Morris, Epstein, West, & 
Engler, 1992; Kim & Levine, 1991), perceptual asymmetries, as measured by the strength of 
preferred or improved performance when stimuli are presented to one side of the body (one ear, 
one half of the visual field, etc.), have frequently been used to approximate underlying 
hemispheric brain activity. Though they may not perfectly mirror brain activity, perceptual 
asymmetries are nevertheless highly relevant, as right-ear/left-hemisphere biases in dichotic 
listening tasks predict response to both cognitive behavior therapy and antidepressant medication 
but do not change following either intervention (Bruder, 1996, 1997). 
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The Chimeric Faces Task (CFT; Heller & Levy, 1981) is a well-established method of 
eliciting and measuring perceptual asymmetries related to emotional processing. Substantial 
testing has indicated that healthy, right-handed people perceive emotional facial expressions 
presented to the left hemi-space (e.g., the right hemisphere of the brain) as more salient on the 
CFT (Levy, Heller, Banich, Burton, 1983). Consistent with Jaeger et al (1987), Heller and 
colleagues demonstrated that reduced left-hemispatial bias on the CFT is associated with 
depression. Further, as Heller’s model would predict, anxiety (specifically anxious arousal) has 
been shown to be associated with an opposite pattern of right posterior activity and is related to 
an increase in left-hemispatial bias on the CFT (Heller, Etienne, & Miller, 1995; Keller et al., 
2000). 
Remarkably, the strength of left-hemispatial bias on the CFT can also be used to predict 
the development of depressive and anxious symptoms. In a longitudinal study of undergraduate 
women Voelz et al. (2001) found that increased left-hemispatial bias on the CFT predicted 
anxiety symptoms (specifically, anxious arousal symptoms) 6 weeks later, while decreased left-
hemispatial bias predicted decreased positive affectivity (e.g., increased anhedonic depression) 
during the same interval. A recent longitudinal study of youth revealed that not only does 
reduced left-hemispatial bias predict later depressive symptoms, this link is mediated by 
maladaptive responses to interpersonal stress and is unique to the onset of depressive symptoms 
(as opposed to anxiety or misbehavior) (Flynn & Rudolph, 2007; Flynn & Rudolph, 2010). 
What neuropsychological measures like the CFT have suggested, psychophysiological 
measures have confirmed, both across imaging modalities and within multiple populations. For 
example, in an EEG study of war veterans with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), anxious 
arousal symptoms were associated with increased right parietal activation, just as Heller et al. 
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(1993) and Keller et al. (2000) would predict, and the combination of anxious arousal and 
depressive symptoms accounted for nearly 25% of variance in brain activity over the right 
parietal region (Metzger et al., 2004). An MEG study of depressed, non-anxious patients and 
non-depressed controls found that, although both groups demonstrated increased activity in the 
dorsal visual stream in response to neutral and emotional photos, only controls showed increased 
activity in the right tempo-parietal area in response to the emotional pictures (Moratti, Rubio, 
Campo, Keil, & Ortiz, 2008). This supports the assertion that depression is associated with hypo-
activation of the right parietal region, and that this, in turn, may be related to the lack of arousal 
(low-positive affect/high anhedonia) that is characteristic of depression. Indeed, the association 
between depression and reduced right posterior hemisphere activity has been well established in 
both depressed and subclinical samples (Henriques & Davidson, 1997; Rabe, Debener, Brocke, 
& Beauducel, 2005) as well as formerly depressed patients (Henriques & Davidson, 1990) and 
even the children and grandchildren of depressed patients (Bruder, Tenke, Warner, & Weissman, 
2007). Moreover, individual differences in perceptual asymmetries on the CFT have been shown 
to be remarkably stable (Levy et al., 1983) and to exist independently of current mood state 
(Compton, Fisher, Koenig, McKeown, & Munoz, 2003). 
The robust finding of reduced right parietal activity in depression may be associated with 
impaired executive functioning in several ways. First, as an indication of an impaired ability to 
perform visuospatial tasks (Asthana, Mandal, Khurana, & Haque-Nizamie, 1998; Elliott et al., 
1996), it may be associated with specific deficits in aspects of planning and organizing. 
Secondly, as a vulnerability marker reflecting a reduced capacity to process emotional 
information, it may be associated with specific deficits in emotional control. Lastly, as Flynn and 
Rudolph have shown, as a vulnerability marker interacting with interpersonal stress, it may result 
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in increased negative affect/anhedonic depression symptoms (Bruder, 1995) which in turn has 
been shown to be uniquely associated with deficits in shifting and selective attention (Austin et 
al., 1999). 
Measuring Executive Function 
Though executive function as a construct is far from perfect (for an excellent review of 
this problem, see Dick & Overton, 2010) and various definitions of executive function exist, 
executive functions are typically defined as a set of higher-order cognitive abilities that direct 
more molecular capacities like attention and memory to orchestrate complex, goal-oriented 
behaviors (Stuss & Levine, 2002; Welsh & Pennington, 1988). Executive functions are necessary 
and crucial, then, when circumstances require that these lower-order capacities be deployed in a 
non-routine or non-habitual manner. Following from this, conceptualizations of executive 
function typically include inhibition, shifting, planning, cognitive and behavioral fluency, and 
working memory (Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996). 
Importantly, though the studies cited thus far refer almost exclusively to relationships 
between depression and executive function deficits as measured by formal neuropsychological 
tests, it is not uncommon even for individuals with known brain injuries and physical head 
trauma to perform normally on formal tests but nonetheless manifest significant executive 
function impairment in real-world situations (Stuss & Buckle, 1992). In a study of severely 
depressed inpatients awaiting electroconvulsive therapy, self ratings of cognitive disability were 
not particularly strongly associated with neuropsychological tests of cognitive ability (except for 
memory) but were better at predicting ratings of well-being and physical disability than formal 
test measurements (Naismith, Longley, Scott, & Hickie, 2007). Thus, the literature assessing 
executive function deficits in unipolar depression may underestimate the impairment associated 
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with the disorder because ecologically valid measures of real-life impairment are infrequently, if 
ever, used. Indeed, the only known study to use an ecologically valid measure demonstrated that 
global cognitive impairment (not age nor illness severity) was associated with problems in 
instrumental activities of daily living (handling finances, employment, etc.; McCall & Dunn, 
2003). The present study, therefore, employed a measure of executive functions that was 
designed to be ecologically valid and measure everyday real-world deficits (Gioia & Isquith, 
2004). 
A Multivariate Approach 
Although most researchers have indicated that identification of a pattern of deficits is 
their primary objective, hardly any have used statistical techniques well-suited for this purpose, 
especially given the high inter-correlation among individual executive functions. When 
multivariate approaches have been used, rather than interpret the omnibus findings using follow-
up techniques that preserve a multivariate approach (for example, through descriptive 
discriminant analysis), many researchers have settled for multiple univariate tests, an approach 
that has been widely criticized by statisticians on both conceptual (why do the multivariate test in 
the first place? ) and technical grounds (because of increased likelihood of type-I error) (Enders, 
2003; Grice & Iwasaki, 2007; Huberty & Morris, 1989). Thus, the present study adopted a 
systematically multivariate approach, using descriptive discriminant analysis (DDA) to discern a 
pattern of deficits that optimally differentiated unipolar depression from anxiety, remitted 
depression, and individuals without a history of mental disorder. Lastly, the results of the DDA 
were used to guide regression analyses to determine whether deficits in executive function 
predicted current disability, as measured by a rating system frequently used by insurance 
companies to decide disability claims.  
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Method 
Participants 
The present study utilized two sources of participants in a retrospective, cross-sectional 
design. Both sets of participants were recruited over several years for a separate neuroimaging 
study. The recruiting process for each source differed slightly, as described below. 
Psychology students from a large Midwestern university were recruited from a larger 
pool (N = 2, 637) of students who completed questionnaires as partial fulfillment of a class 
research requirement. In service of the fMRI study mentioned above, students were selected 
based upon their profile of scores on a trio of measures assessing worry, anxious arousal, and 
anhedonic depression, respectively. Following established guidelines (Nitschke, Heller, Imig, 
McDonald, & Miller, 2001), the 80
th
 percentile was used to demarcate elevated scores and the 
50
th
 percentile was used to demarcate normal-range scores on the aforementioned measures of 
symptoms. Thus, students were recruited and subsequently utilized in the present study if they 
met criteria for one of the following profiles: elevated on all three measures, elevated on one of 
the measures and normal on the two other measures, or normal on all three measures. This 
process resulted in 103 student participants (62 female, 41 male), aged 18 to 22 (M = 19.02, SD 
= 1.04). Importantly, the specific profile of scores associated with any particular participant was 
concealed from investigators to prevent bias. The questionnaire data used to recruit participants 
were not analyzed in the present study. To ensure stability of symptoms and to standardize when 
participants’ symptoms were assessed, student participants completed symptom measures a 
second time, and only these data were used in the present analyses. 
To enhance variability in age, education, symptom severity, and co-morbidity, a second 
source of participants was included in the present study. A total of 149 participants (95 female, 
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54 male), aged 19 to 51 (M = 34.62, SD = 9.23), were recruited from the community through 
electronic and newspaper advertisements, word of mouth, and a local mental health center. These 
participants were also recruited for a separate neuroimaging study. Although community 
participants, unlike students, were recruited without advance knowledge of their current pattern 
of symptoms, the number of individuals meeting provisional or full criteria for one or more 
diagnoses was roughly equivalent in each sample (104 of 149 and 44 of 103 in the community 
and student groups, respectively). Participants were screened for left-handedness, impaired 
vision or hearing, pregnancy, history of serious head injury or prolonged loss of consciousness, 
past receipt of electroconvulsive therapy, metal embedded in the body (due to restrictions in the 
neuroimaging study), recent substance use, and English as a second language. Participants were 
financially compensated for their participation. The two samples were combined for further 
analysis, except where noted below. 
Self-Report Measures of Symptoms 
As current level of symptoms and illness severity may affect executive functions (Austin, 
1999; Burt, Zembar, & Niederehe, 1995; Veiel, 1997), both depressive and anxious symptoms 
were assessed in the present study via three scales on two self-report measures. 
Worry. Worry, as a measure of anxious apprehension in Heller’s (1993) model, has been 
shown to affect brain activity in areas of the frontal lobes known to be involved in implementing 
executive functions (Engels et al., 2007, 2010). Therefore, the Penn State Worry Questionnaire 
(PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990; Molina & Borkovec, 1994) was used to 
assess anxious apprehension in the present study. This 16-item questionnaire asked participants 
to rate how well a variety of statements characterized them, such as “my worries overwhelm 
me,” from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very typical). The PSWQ had a very high reliability in this sample, 
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Cronbach’s  = .96.  
Anxious arousal. The Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ; Watson & 
Clark, et al., 1995; Watson & Weber, et al., 1995) is a 77-item self-report measure designed 
around the Tripartite Model of Affect and, as such, assesses general distress as well as anxiety-
specific (Anxious Arousal; MASQ-AA) and depression-specific (Anhedonic Depression; 
MASQ-AD) symptoms. Because the intent of the present study was to differentiate disorders, the 
General Distress Subscale, as a measure of what is largely shared by anxiety and depression, was 
not used. 
Because increased right-hemisphere asymmetry has primarily been associated with the 
anxious arousal dimension of anxiety (Heller & Nitschke, 1998; Metzger et al., 2004), the 
MASQ-AA was used to obtain a measure of anxious arousal. The MASQ-AA scale asks 
participants to indicate how much they have experienced a symptom (such as “startled easily” 
and “was trembling or shaking”) during the previous week, from 1 (not all) to 5 (extremely). 
Higher scores reflect more symptoms. The Anxious Arousal subscale of the MASQ had high 
reliability in this sample, Cronbach’s  = .81.  
Anhedonic depression. Because melancholic depression (which is characterized by loss 
of pleasure and diminished response to rewarding stimuli; American Psychiatric Association, 
2000) has been shown to be uniquely associated with deficits in shifting and selective attention 
(Austin et al., 1999), the Anhedonic Depression (AD) scale of the MASQ was selected to 
measure current depressive symptoms. The MASQ-AD scale uses the same rating system as the 
MASQ-AA scale but asks participants to consider symptoms such as “felt withdrawn from other 
people” and “felt like nothing was very enjoyable.” Previous research (Nitschke et al., 2001) has 
shown that the AD scale can be further reduced into subcomponents that roughly correspond to 
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Loss of Interest (LI) and High Positive Affect (HP) as identified by Watson, Clark, et al. (1995). 
Recent research has suggested that, compared to the full AD scale or the reverse-scored HP scale 
the 8-item LI scale better distinguishes current depression from past-depression and no 
depression in non-patients (Bredemeier et al., in press). Thus, only the 8-item LI scale (MASQ-
AD8) was used as a measure of anhedonic depressive symptoms in the present study. The 8 item 
Anhedonic Depression subscale of the MASQ had a high reliability in this sample, Cronbach’s  
= .82.  
Neuropsychological Measures 
Executive function. The Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function- Self-Report 
Version (BRIEF-SR; Guy, Isquith, & Gioia, 1996) was used to obtain measures of current 
executive function. As discussed above, the BRIEF-SR was designed to capture everyday 
problems with executive functions that formal neuropsychological testing, with its necessarily 
highly structured assessments, may miss (Gioia & Isquith, 2004). Participants were asked to 
indicate how frequently (Never, Sometimes, or Often) they had had problems with a list of 
behaviors (such as “having a short attention span”) in the last 6 months. The BRIEF-SR is 
composed of 80 items that can be reduced to 8 non-overlapping scales which are described in 
Table 1. 
The Inhibit, Shift, Emotional Control, and Monitor scales are combined to produce a 
Behavior Regulation Index (BRI), which is an overall measure of executive functioning as it 
pertains to regulating everyday behavior. Similarly, the Working Memory, Plan/Organize, 
Organization of Materials, and Task Completion scales are combined to produce a 
Metacognition Index (MCI), which is an overall measure of problem-solving ability via planning 
and organizational skills. Finally, the BRI and MCI can be combined to produce a Global 
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Executive Composite (GEC). Higher scores indicate greater deficits in executive functions. The 
BRIEF-SR has been shown to have high (.96 for the GEC) to moderate (.72 for the scales with 
fewer items) internal consistency and correlates moderately (.56 for the GEC) with well-
validated informant versions on which it was based (Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & Kenworthy, 2000). 
In this sample, the reliabilities for the BRI, MCI, and GEC were all very high, with Chronbach’s 
’s equal to .93, .94, and .96, respectively. On the individual subscales the reliability varied from 
a low of .76 for the Organization of Materials subscale to a high of .91 for the Emotional Control 
subscale. As expected, the subscales with the lowest reliability (Organization of Materials and 
Monitor) were also the subscales with the fewest items (with only 7 and 5 items, respectively). 
Only the Organization of Materials and Monitor subscales had Chronbach ’s lower than the 
recommended .08, and neither had a Chronbach lower than .76.  
Importantly, the BRIEF-SR also contains scales to assess how inconsistently and 
negatively participants rate themselves. Per the recommendation of the manual, participants with 
inconsistency scales greater than or equal to 7 were excluded from further analysis. Thus, all of 
the 149 community participants and all of the 104 student participants had inconsistency scores 
less than or equal to 6. Lastly, although an adult version of the BRIEF-SR now exists, at the time 
of data collection only an adolescent version was available. Careful inspection of the items on 
the adult and adolescent measures revealed that the differences between the two are slight and 
likely insignificant. For example, in the adult version Task Completion is called Task Monitor, 
and, as with the child version of the BRIEF, an Initiate scale was added. The versions are 
approximately the same length (80 versus 75 questions), and both yield BRI, MCI, and GEC 
composite subscales. 
Perceptual/hemispheric asymmetry. The Chimeric Faces Task (CFT; Levy, Heller, 
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Banich, & Burton, 1983) was used to assess asymmetric hemispheric activity. The CFT is a free-
vision task comprised of a 36-page booklet. Each page displays two chimeric (split) faces with 
one half of the face portraying a smile and the other half of the face portraying a neutral 
expression. The chimeric faces are arranged vertically, the two chimeras on a single page are of 
the same person, and each face is a mirror image of the other. Participants were asked to decide 
which face looked happier, the top or the bottom. Responses indicating a preference for the smile 
being in the left visuospatial field (e.g., indicating right-hemisphere activity) were scored as -1, 
and responses indicating a preference for the smile being in the right visuospatial field were 
scored as 1. A mean perceptual asymmetry score was calculated by adding the individual scores 
for each pair of chimeric faces and dividing by 36. Importantly, higher (e.g., more positive) 
scores on the measure reflect reduced right-hemisphere bias. The mean and standard deviation 
for the entire sample (N = 252) was M = -.46 (SD = .44), which is comparable to those found by 
Levy et al. (1983; M = -.30, SD = .44) and Heller et al. (1995; M = -.38, SD = .50). The CFT had 
a very high reliability in this sample, Cronbach’s  = .92.  
Diagnostic Interview 
Participants were assessed for Axis I psychopathology using the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV Disorders, Non-patient Edition (SCID-IV-NP; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & 
Williams, 2002). Doctoral-student clinicians with at least a year of inpatient SCID experience 
conducted the interviews and arrived at diagnoses for each participant after consultation with 
other interviewers and a licensed clinical psychologist with more than twenty years experience. 
Interviews were audio-recorded to ensure fidelity. 
Information gathered during the interview is summarized using a four-point scale for 
each diagnosis. A rating of four indicates that full clinical criteria for that diagnosis have been 
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met; three indicates a provisional diagnosis or the absence of one or two needed criteria to meet 
clinical thresholds; two indicates the presence of only a few symptoms; and one indicates the 
absence or near absence of symptoms for that diagnosis. For the purposes of classification in this 
study, participants were considered to have sufficiently met criteria for a disorder if they were 
given a rating of a three (provisional) or a four (certain). Diagnosis was then used to select 
participants for inclusion in study groups and to exclude participants from further analysis. Using 
these standards, data from participants who met criteria for the following DSM-IV diagnoses 
were excluded: past mania, current mania, hypomania, Bipolar Not-Otherwise-Specified, 
Bipolar-I, Bipolar-II, Cyclothymia, Mood Disorder Caused by a General Medical Condition, 
Substance Induced Mood Disorder, Schizophrenia, Schizoaffective Disorder, Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder, Anxiety Disorder due to a General Medical Condition, Substance-Induced 
Anxiety Disorder, Somatization Disorder, Conversion Disorder, Pain Disorder, Hypochondriasis, 
Body Dysmorphic Disorder, Anorexia Nervosa, Bulimia Nervosa, Eating Disorder Not-
Otherwise-Specified, Substance Abuse, Substance Dependence, and Lifetime Substance Abuse. 
Though these exclusions may have weakened the generalizability of the data (e.g., many of the 
excluded disorders are frequently co-morbid with anxiety and depression), the selection criteria 
were designed to limit confounding influences on executive function impairment as well as to 
create more homogeneity within diagnostic groups to better isolate the constructs of interest (the 
executive function impairments associated specifically with unipolar depression). The exclusion 
of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) - the only major anxiety disorder to be excluded - was 
motivated by correlational and factor-analytic work on diagnostic taxonomy suggesting that 
OCD is not optimally characterized by common factors extracted from anxiety and mood 
disorders (Watson, 2005), as well as neurological evidence suggesting that OCD is on a 
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continuum of movement and tic disorders that are conceptually distinct from anxiety (Rapoport, 
1990). In principle, OCD could have been treated as its own diagnostic category and analyzed 
accordingly. However, too few participants met criteria for this disorder (N = 7, 2 of whom had 
current problematic alcohol issues) to make such an analysis feasible. Therefore, OCD was 
excluded from further consideration. 
Due to a cohort effect of heavier drinking among young adults (22% of all participants 
aged 18 to 29 and 16.5% of students met criteria for Alcohol Abuse or Dependence), alcohol use 
was assessed in more detail before decisions about exclusion were made. After completing the 
self-report measures, participants completed a short questionnaire concerning their current 
alcohol-use habits. Composed of four items from the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test 
(AUDIT; Saunders & Aasland, 1987; Saunders, Aasland, Babor, De La Fuerte, & Grant, 1993), 
this questionnaire asked participants to indicate how frequently (seldom, once a month, twice a 
month, weekly, or daily) they drank more than 5 drinks in a 24-hour period, drank more than 4 
drinks in a 24-hour period, missed class (or work) due to drinking, or experienced periods of 
memory loss or blackout after drinking (“forgotten where I was or what I did”). To ensure 
current alcohol use was at a level that would not reasonably be expected to affect current 
cognitive functioning, participants were excluded from further analysis if they indicated that they 
drank 5 or more drinks in a 24-hour period more than twice a month, drank 4 or more drinks in a 
24-hour period more than once a week, more than seldom missed class (or work) due to drinking, 
or more than seldom experienced memory loss after drinking. Twenty-five participants did not 
complete the assessment for current alcohol use. Instead, the narrative summary of their SCID-
IV-NP interview was reviewed to determine their current alcohol-use habits. Using the above 
standards, 7 of the 149 community participants and 35 of the 103 students met criteria for current 
20 
problematic alcohol use; their data were excluded from subsequent analysis. Notably, though the 
intent of the alcohol-use measure was to reduce unnecessary data loss due to oversensitivity of 
the SCID-IV-NP alcohol abuse criteria in younger participants, the net result slightly increased 
loss in the student sample, as 18 students who did not meet diagnostic criteria for an alcohol 
disorder did meet criteria for current problematic alcohol use. However, the classification system 
did succeed in reducing the amount of data lost in the community group, saving 53 participants 
from unnecessary removal.  
Initially, substance use was similarly re-assessed to reduce data loss. However, a review 
of the SCID-IV-NP summaries for participants meeting criteria for a substance disorder revealed 
that, although most participants were not currently abusing substances, many participants had 
been poly-substance users for variable periods of time, including within months of participation. 
Therefore, in order to prevent the introduction of systematic error in cognitive ability, no 
additional measures were employed to reduce data loss from substance abusing and substance 
dependent participants: any participant who met criteria for substance abuse or dependence (even 
lifetime abuse or dependence) were excluded from further analysis.  
Use of the SCID-IV-NP also provided a measure of general disability via the Global 
Assessment of Functioning (GAF), a 100-point rating scale designed to capture overall illness 
severity and general functional impairment. A rating of 100 on the GAF indicates superior 
functioning across life-domains (work, social, family, etc.); a rating of 50 indicates severe 
symptoms such as suicidal ideations or chronic unemployment; and a rating of 10 indicates 
persistent danger of hurting self or others, inability to maintain minimal personal hygiene, or a 
serious suicidal act with a clear expectation of death (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
Although the GAF has questionable reliability and validity (Soderberg, Tungstrom, & Armelius, 
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2005), insurance companies heavily weight GAF ratings in decisions concerning insurance 
eligibility and disability status (Bilsker, Wiseman, & Gilbert, 2006). Thus, for the purposes of 
the present study it served as an ecologically relevant measure of disability. 
Based on the SCID, remaining participants were classified into four groups defined by 
the following: past depression (N = 41; met criteria for at least one past depressive episode and 
no current depression with or without comorbid anxiety); current depression (N = 9; met criteria 
for a major depressive episode at the time of the study with or without comorbid anxiety); 
anxiety (N = 30; met criteria for an anxiety disorder other than OCD and did not meet criteria for 
any depressive disorder); and control (62; did not meet criteria for any diagnosis, past nor 
present). Ideally, the depression groups could have been further subdivided based on the 
presence or absence of co-morbid anxiety; however, only 5 participants met criteria for a current 
major depressive episode and only 4 met criteria for a current major depressive episode 
combined with comorbid anxiety. Therefore, to maximize power and to preserve the ability to 
perform meaningful analyses, the groups were collapsed as described above (e.g., co-morbid 
anxiety was mixed with “pure” depression in both the current and past depressed groups). 
Importantly, the two depression groups contained approximately equal proportions of individuals 
who additionally met criteria for a comorbid anxiety disorder (4 of 9 in the currently depressed 
group, and 20 of 41 in the previously depressed group, respectively). DDA is designed to 
downplay group similarities (Betz, 1987). Thus, because all three psychopathology groups 
contain anxiety, and the two depression groups contain it in approximately equal proportions, the 
discriminant function(s) derived from comparison of the four diagnostic groups should largely 
reflect the influence of the presence or absence of depression. In other words, because it is 
unlikely that the pattern of deficits caused exclusively by anxiety will optimally discriminate 
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between three groups that contain anxiety, the pattern associated with depression, which does 
discriminate between all groups, can still be expected to emerge from the DDA despite co-
morbidity within the depression groups. 
Procedure 
Participants completed questionnaire booklets containing the CFT, the MASQ-AA, the 
MASQ-AD, the BRIEF, and other measures not analyzed in the present study while alone in a 
laboratory room following completion of a general orientation to the previously mentioned 
neuroimaging study. The PSWQ, along with other measures, formed part of a questionnaire 
packet that participants could take home to finish if they did not complete all of the 
questionnaires in the time allotted (approximately an hour). The diagnostic interviews were 
conducted in a private office two to four weeks after completion of the written questionnaires 
and the CFT. 
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Results 
Data Analysis 
The data were examined for outliers. Participants with scores greater than 2.5 standard 
deviations (SD) from the group mean on any measure were excluded from subsequent analysis. 
The dependent measures were tested, by group, for non-normality using the Shapiro-Wilks test. 
Additionally, skewness and kurtosis values were converted to z-scores and evaluated for 
significance. Measures with distributions characterized by significant skewness or kurtosis and 
significant non-normality as indicated by the Shapiro-Wilks test were excluded from further 
analysis. Thus, the Task Completion scale on the BRIEF was not analyzed singly. However, the 
Task Completion scale is a component of the Meta Cognition Index (MCI), and the distribution 
of the MCI was approximately normal for each diagnostic group. Therefore, important 
differences in Task Completion, if they exist, were captured indirectly in other analyses. All 
analyses were performed using SPSS, Version 17.0. 
First, diagnostic groups (including the diagnosis-free group) were compared for 
equivalence in age and years of education using univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA). Then, 
zero-order correlations were computed to examine the general pattern of association between 
current symptoms, disability, and the neuropsychological measures. Although a Bonferroni 
correction was not applied to avoid being overly conservative, significance was determined at p 
< .01 to reduce the risk of Type I error (Perneger, 1998). Significant correlations were then used 
to guide selection of independent variables for DDA, which was used to determine whether a 
specific pattern of executive function deficits characterized each diagnostic group. Lastly, the 
results of the DDA were used to guide regression analyses to determine whether the specific 
pattern(s) of executive function deficits detected could be used to predict current functional 
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disability as measured by Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scores.  
Group Characteristics 
Data on the highest level of education achieved was available for 93 participants (25 past 
depressed, 8 currently depressed, 19 with anxiety, and 41 controls). To estimate whether level of 
education differed significantly across diagnostic groups, a one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was computed using data from this subset of 93. Levene’s statistic was non-
significant, indicating homogeneity of variances across the subset. The groups were found to 
differ in their level of education, F (3, 89) = 3.11, p = .03. However, the Hochberg GT2 test 
(selected because of the large differences between sample sizes across groups; Hochberg, 1974) 
did not reveal any significant differences between the groups, although the difference between 
the past depression and the control groups approached significance, M = 1.75, p = .07, ns. 
Notably, the mean number of years of education attained for the past depression group was 16.7 
(SD = 3.5), while the mean for the current depression group was 14.1 (SD = 1.1). This equals the 
difference between being finished and being half-way through college. Since almost half the 
sample was composed of college students, this difference, while statistically significant, is in 
practical terms likely unimportant. 
To determine whether the groups differed in their level of current disability, a one-way 
ANOVA was computed using GAF scores as the dependent measure. Levene’s statistic was 
found to be significant. Thus, in place of the typical F statistic, the Welch and Brown-Forsythe 
statistics were computed. Both tests indicated that GAF scores were unequal across groups, with 
F (3, 30.55) = 27.75, p < .01 and F (3, 53.68) = 21.57, p < .01, respectively. The Games-Howell 
post hoc test revealed the following: GAF scores were lower in the current depressed group than 
in all other groups, and GAF scores in the past depressed and anxiety groups were lower than in 
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the control group but not significantly different from each other (all ps < .05). 
Table 2 presents demographic characteristics for the 4 study groups and for the entire 
sample. Not unexpectedly, women were over-represented in the diagnostic groups, but roughly 
equally so. A one-way ANOVA was performed to assess whether the groups differed in age. 
Levene’s statistic was non-significant, indicating homogeneity of variances across groups. 
Results indicated that no group was older or younger than another, F (3, 138) = 2.27, p = .08, ns. 
Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations for all measures used in the analyses. 
Visual inspection of the means suggested a trend of heightened impairment across executive 
function domains in the current depression group, followed by similar levels of impairment in 
the past depression group and anxiety group. It appeared, as well, that the past depression group 
was different than (e.g., more impaired than) the control group. As expected, the current 
depression group had the most positive score on the CFT, whereas the anxiety group had the 
most negative. However, a one-way ANOVA revealed that these differences were non-
significant, F (3, 138) = 1.75, p = .16, ns, though when considered as a one-tailed test, the trend 
approached significance (p = .08).  
Correlations 
Tables 4 and 5 present the correlations among the variables for each group, with Table 4 
displaying the correlations within the past and currently depressed groups, and Table 5 
displaying the correlations within the anxiety and control groups. Table 6 presents the 
correlations among the variables within the sample as a whole. As described above, to adjust for 
the number of comparisons performed, significance was determined at p < .01. The BRIEF 
subscales were moderately correlated with each other across groups. Thus, they were well-suited 
for DDA, which works best with moderately correlated independent variables (Sherry, 2006). 
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Surprisingly, the CFT was uncorrelated with any other measure within any of the groups. 
Therefore, based on the recommendations of Finch (2010), it was not entered into the DDA. 
Similarly, GAF was significantly associated with a measure of executive functioning only in the 
Anxiety group and the full sample, the Monitor subscale was associated with a symptom 
measure only in the full sample, and the Inhibit and Organization of Materials subscales of the 
BRIEF were not found to be associated with any symptom measures in any group. Therefore, the 
GAF, Monitor, Inhibit, and Organization of Materials variables were also withheld from the 
DDA. Very few measures were significantly associated with any other variables in the current 
depression group. This was likely due to the very small sample size of this group. Not 
unexpectedly, across groups symptoms were significantly associated with the various subscales 
of the BRIEF (except the few mentioned above). Thus, the symptom measures were also 
included in the DDA below. 
Descriptive Discriminant Analysis (DDA) 
As described above, executive functions have been conceptualized as a set of correlated 
skills. Because univariate analyses are, in effect, blind to correlations between dependent 
measures, executive functions are therefore best suited for analysis in a multivariate context 
(Grice & Iwasaki, 2007). However, unlike the multivariate technique of Multivariate Analysis of 
Variance (MANOVA), DDA can be used to determine not only whether groups differ on a 
selection of correlated variables but how they differ (Sherry, 2006). Thus, a DDA was performed 
to examine the differences between diagnostic groups on the selected BRIEF subscales (Huberty, 
1984). As previous research and the above correlation analyses have indicated, current symptoms 
influence executive functions in significant ways. Therefore, the three symptom measures (the 
PSWQ, the MASQ-AA, and the MASQ-AD8) and the Shift, Emotional Control, Working 
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Memory, and Plan/Organization subscales of the BRIEF were entered as independent variables 
in the DDA. 
Box’s M test was non-significant using an alpha level of .001, (p = .003), indicating that 
the assumption of homogeneity of variances between groups was not violated. Table 7 displays 
the canonical correlations, tests of significance, and effect sizes for the three discriminant 
functions produced in the DDA. Examining the canonical discriminant functions, there was a 
modest canonical correlation (.544) for Function 1, a modest canonical correlation (.422) for 
Function 2, and a small canonical correlation (.276) for Function 3. The tests of the full model 
(Functions 1-3) and a reduced model (Functions 2-3) were statistically significant at p < .01. 
Function 3, tested on its own, approached significance (p = .056). Therefore, it was also 
interpreted with Functions 1 and 2, below. 
Table 8 displays the standardized discriminant function coefficients and structure 
coefficients for all analyses. In DDA, function coefficients are analogous to beta weights in 
regression, and structure coefficients represent the correlation between the latent discriminant 
function variable and the observed variables. Although both types of coefficients can be used to 
determine the relative importance of each variable in a given discriminant function, because 
function coefficients can be highly affected by multicollinearity (Courville & Thompson, 2001), 
structure coefficients are frequently given more weight in this determination. Using the cutoff 
value recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) and demonstrated to provide optimal 
power by Finch (2010), structure coefficients greater than 0.3 were considered significant 
contributors to a given function and, therefore, worthy of interpretation. As shown in Table 8, the 
Anehdonic Depression scale, the Anxious Arousal scale, and the Emotional Control subscale of 
the BRIEF contributed heavily to group differences on Function 1. The Shifting and 
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Planning/Organization subscales of the BRIEF and the Anxious Apprehension (Worry) subscale 
also contributed to group differences for the first function. For Function 2, Anxious 
Apprehension (Worry) contributed heavily, followed by the Emotional Control, Shifting, and 
Working Memory subscales from the BRIEF. Lastly, for Function 3, the Anhedonic Depression 
measure was again a very large, but negative, contributor to group differences, followed by the 
Emotional Control subscale and the Anxious Apprehension (worry) scale. 
As is evident in the group centroids displayed in Table 9, the current depression group 
scored much higher on the first function than did any of the three other groups. Thus, the first 
function was interpreted as characterizing current depression. For ease of interpretation, 
variables found to distinguish groups on each function will always be listed in descending order 
by the magnitude of the absolute value of the variable’s structure coefficient. Therefore, from the 
first function it was determined that current depression could be distinguished from anxiety and 
past depression due to elevated anhedonic depression symptoms, increased impairment in 
emotional control, elevated anxious arousal and anxious apprehension symptoms, and increased 
impairment in planning and organizing as well as shifting.  
In the same fashion, the group centroids for the second function revealed that the past 
depression group scored highest on this function, followed by the anxiety group, whereas the 
currently depressed and control groups scored similarly to each other but in the opposite 
direction of the past depression and anxiety groups. Thus, the second function largely 
characterized the past depression group, which was distinguishable from the other groups due to 
elevated worry (anxious apprehension) symptoms and increased impairment in emotional 
control, shifting, and working memory.  
Finally, the group centroids on the third function indicated that the pure anxiety group 
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was best distinguished from the other groups by low anhedonic depression symptoms, increased 
impairment in emotional control, and elevated worry (anxious apprehension) symptoms. 
Considered collectively, the three functions indicated that problems with emotional control 
differentiated the clinical groups from the control group, whereas impairments in shifting 
uniquely characterized depression (current and past) from both the anxiety and the control 
groups. Additionally, the three functions suggested that problems with planning and organizing 
uniquely characterize current depression, whereas problems with working memory uniquely 
characterized past depression.  
Lastly, univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to determine whether the 
discriminant scores for each diagnostic group were significantly different for each function. 
Where statistics robust against violation of homogeneity of variances were not required, 
Hochberg’s GT2 test was used for post-hoc analysis of significant ANOVA due to the large 
differences in samples sizes across groups (Hochberg, 1974). For Function 1, Levene’s statistic 
was found to be significant. Thus, the Welch and Brown-Forsythe statistics were computed in 
place of the typical F statistic. Both robust tests indicated that discriminant scores significantly 
differed across groups, with F (3, 30.42) = 7.56, p < .01, and F (3, 24.79) = 12.27, p < .01, 
respectively. The Games-Howell post hoc test revealed that the current depression group scored 
higher on the first function than the control group, the past depression group, and the anxiety 
group (all ps < .05), who scored approximately the same. For Function 2, Levene’s statistic was 
non-significant; thus, the typical F test was computed, which revealed significant differences 
between groups on the second function, F (3, 138) = 9.90, p < .001. Using Hochberg’s GT2 post-
hoc test, it was determined that both the past depression (who scored highest) and the anxiety 
groups scored significantly higher than the control group on the second function (all ps < .001). 
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The differences between the current depression group and the other groups on Function 2 were 
not significant, though the current depressives scored most similarly to the control group on this 
function (M = -.19, SD = .36). Finally, Levene’s statistic was significant for Function 3. The 
Welch and Brown-Forsythe statistics revealed significant differences between groups, Welch F 
(3, 32.12) = 5.03, p < .05. The Games-Howell statistic computed post-hoc indicated that the 
anxiety group scored significantly higher on the third function than both the control (p < .05) and 
the past depression groups (p < .01), who scored similarly to each other and to the current 
depression group. Table 10 summarizes the results of the DDA. 
Regression Analyses  
 A series of post-hoc, exploratory hierarchical multiple regression analyses were 
conducted to examine whether the executive function deficits found to characterize and 
differentiate groups in the DDA could be used to predict current functional disability as indicated 
by scores on the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scale from the diagnostic interview. 
As described above, the DDA demonstrated that combinations of the four BRIEF subscales 
could be used to significantly differentiate between groups. Specifically, emotional control 
differentiated the clinical groups from the control group, shifting differentiated both depression 
groups from the other groups, planning/organization differentiated the current depression group 
from the other groups, and working memory differentiated the past depression group from the 
other groups.  
First, to determine whether each of the four subscales predicted disability in the full 
sample (N = 142), four hierarchical multiple regressions were performed. One BRIEF subscale 
per regression was entered alone in the first step of each of the multiple regressions. Because 
past research and the correlational and DDA analyses above indicated that current symptoms 
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affect both executive functioning and current level of disability, anhedonic depression and 
anxious apprehension symptoms were entered simultaneously in a second step for each multiple 
regression. As displayed in Table 11, all four of the full regression models (BRIEF subscale plus 
symptom measures) predicting GAF were significant, with problems in each area of executive 
functioning emerging as negative predictors of global functioning (e.g., positive predictors of 
disability). Specifically, the full model that included emotional control accounted for 20%, the 
full model that included shifting accounted for 14%, the full model that included planning and 
organization accounted for 14%, and the full model that included working memory accounted for 
16 % of the variance in general functioning (e.g., disability) across the sample. However, the 
associations between general functioning and shifting, planning/organization, and working 
memory, respectively, reduced to non-significance after the symptom measures were included in 
the second step. As the t-tests indicate, only emotional control continued to significantly predict 
GAF once the symptom measures were added to the model. Thus, the effect of shifting, working 
memory, and planning and organizing on global functioning was attributable to the effect of 
current symptoms, while most of the effect of emotional control on global functioning was not 
attributable to symptoms. Further confirming this, follow-up analyses indicated that although 
anhedonic depression and anxious apprehension (worry) negatively predicted GAF, this 
association reduced to non-significance after emotional control was included in the model, R
2
 = 
.20, F(3, 138) = 11.30, p < .001; t(138) = -1.77, p = .08, ns and t(138) = -1.04, p = .30, ns, for 
depression and anxiety, respectively.  
 Second, to explore whether the four subscales predicted disability in each clinical group 
specifically, four hierarchical multiple regressions were performed per group for the anxiety (N = 
30), current depression (N = 9), and past depression groups (N = 21). Importantly, because the 
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sample sizes in each group were far below what could be considered appropriate for regressions 
with three or four predictors, the within-group regressions were performed solely to explore 
whether the trends observed in the full sample could be replicated within the clinical groups (the 
depression groups specifically) in less than ideal statistical conditions. They were therefore 
interpreted with caution.  
As described above, the current and past depression groups were composed of equal 
proportions of individuals with “pure” depression and individuals with co-morbid depression and 
anxiety to increase power for the DDA. However, this heterogeneity of diagnoses was 
problematic for the group-specific regression analyses because of the confounding potential of 
the co-morbid anxiety. To reduce the effect of co-morbid anxiety in the past depression group, 
individuals with co-morbidity were excluded from all regression analyses within this group. 
Thus, for the group specific regression analyses the past-depression group contained only 21 
participants instead of 41. Unfortunately, due to the small size of the current depression group 
this same strategy could not be similarly used within this group to “un-confound” anxiety and 
current depression. Instead, the interaction between anhedonic depression and anxious 
apprehension was entered as a predictor in a third step for all hierarchical regression analyses 
within this group. Thus, rather than remove the effect of comorbid anxiety, the effect of co-
morbidity was modeled in the current depression group. Otherwise, the regression analyses for 
the three clinical groups were conducted in the exact same fashion as for the full sample above.  
As displayed in Table 12, emotional control significantly predicted GAF in the anxious 
group in both the full and the reduced models, F(3,26) = 3.29, p < .05 (full model). In the current 
depression group, emotional control approached significance as a predictor in the full model that 
included the interaction between anhedonic depression and anxious apprehension, as displayed in 
33 
Table 13. Lastly, in the past depression group, emotional control approached significance as a 
predictor in the reduced model, as displayed in Table 14. As with the full sample, problems with 
emotional control generally emerged as a negative predictor of global functioning (e.g., a 
positive predictor of disability) across groups, though in the current depression group this trend 
was reversed, with impaired emotional control associated with better functioning, t(4) = 2.61, p < 
.10, ns. The Shifting, Planning/Organization, and Working Memory subscales of the BRIEF did 
not emerge as significant predictors of global functioning within any of the clinical groups. With 
the exception of anxious apprehension (which emerged as a negative predictor of global 
functioning in the anxiety group, R
2
 = .16, F(1, 28) = 5.23, p < .05), current anhedonic 
depression and anxious apprehension symptoms also did not significantly predict global 
functioning within the clinical groups.  
 Finally, within each clinical group exploratory multiple regression analyses were 
conducted to further examine the relationship between current anxious apprehension and 
anhedonic depression symptoms and impairment on the four subscales of the BRIEF. First, the 
four BRIEF subscales were entered simultaneously in multiple regressions predicting symptoms 
within the three clinical groups. Non-significant predictors, if any, were removed, and the 
multiple regression analyses were repeated (with predictors, again, entered simultaneously).  
In the anxiety group, a model including problems with emotional control and planning 
and organizing significantly predicted anhedonic depression symptoms, R
2
 = .55, F(2, 27) = 
16.23, p < .001. As indicated by the beta values, both emerged as positive predictors of 
anhedonic symptoms, ß = 0.39, t(27) = 2.91, p < .01 and ß = 0.55, t(27) = 4.09, p < .001 
respectively. A model including emotional control, shifting, and planning and organization 
significantly predicted anxious apprehension symptoms in the anxiety group, R
2
 = .42, F(3, 26) = 
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6.34, p < .01. Emotional control emerged as a positive predictor of anxious apprehension 
symptoms, while planning and organizing emerged as a negative predictor of anxious 
apprehension symptoms, ß = 0.38, t(26) = 2.32, p < .001 and ß = -0.56, t(26) = -3.46, p < .01. 
Shifting approached significance as a positive predictor of anxious apprehension symptoms, ß = 
0.33, t(26) = 1.93, p = .065, ns.  
In the current depression group, a model including problems with emotional control, 
planning and organizing, and shifting approached significance in predicting anhedonic 
depression, R
2
 = .75, F(3, 5) = 4.97, p = .058. Specifically, in this model, problems with 
emotional control and planning and organizing emerged as positive predictors of anhedonic 
depression symptoms, ß = 0.96, t(5) = 3.13, p < .05 and ß = 1.45, t(5) = 3.45, p < .05, 
respectively. However, problems with shifting emerged as a negative predictor of anhedonic 
depression in the currently depressed group, ß = -1.42, t(5) = 2.9, p < .05. Problems with 
emotional control emerged as a significant positive predictor of anxious apprehension in the 
currently depressed group, ß = 0.70, R
2
 = .48, F(1, 7) = 6.55, p < .05.  
In the past depression-only group (i.e., the group with co-morbid anxiety participants 
removed), problems with shifting emerged as a positive predictor, ß = 0.66, t(18) = 3.00, p < .01, 
and problems with working memory emerged as a negative predictor, ß = -0.51, t(18) = -2.33, p 
< .05, of anhedonic depression symptoms, R
2
 = .35, F(2, 18) = 4.92, p < .05. Emotional control 
and planning/organization did not emerge as significant predictors of anhedonic depression 
symptoms in the past depression-only group. None of the four BRIEF subscales significantly 
predicted anxious apprehension in the past depression-only group.  
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Discussion 
Though numerous sources of evidence have indicated that impairments in executive 
functions are responsible for the lion’s share of the economic burden associated with unipolar 
major depression, decades of research on this topic have produced more questions than answers. 
Departing from previous research, the present study adopted a systematically multivariate 
approach to examining executive function deficits in unipolar depression, using descriptive 
discriminant analysis (DDA) and multiple regression to discern a pattern of ecologically-valid 
deficits characteristic of depression and predictive of current global functioning, as measured by 
a rating system frequently used by insurance companies to decide disability claims.   
Considered collectively, the three functions that emerged from the DDA suggest that, in 
the realm of executive functioning, unipolar depression (both current and past) is characterized 
by an increased difficulty with shifting. Further, current unipolar depression is specifically 
associated with difficulty planning and organizing, whereas past unipolar depression is 
specifically associated with impairment in working memory. Finally, affective disorders (past 
depression, current depression, and anxiety) appear to share impairment in emotional control, 
which is most pronounced in current unipolar depression.  
Thus, the results of the DDA are generally supportive of the assertion that current 
depression is associated with executive function impairment. Research has found evidence of 
deficits in updating, shifting, and cognitive inhibition (Clark, Sarna, & Goodwin, 2005; Gohier et 
al., 2009; Harvey et al., 2004; Levin et al., 2007; Micco, et al., 2009; Ottowitz, Dougherty, & 
Savage, 2002). The present study’s observation of elevated problems in shifting, emotional 
control (which requires inhibition of emotional responses and emotionally upsetting thoughts), 
and planning and organizing (which requires updating plans to fit changing circumstances) 
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roughly corresponds to this expected pattern of deficits. This harmony of conclusions across 
modes of measurement (including the real-world manifestations of executive dysfunction 
measured in the current study) suggests that the deficits associated with unipolar depression are 
not epiphenomenal. Instead, they appear to represent key features of the disorder that have 
complex and, in the case of emotional control, possibly mediational relationships with symptoms 
and exert considerable influence over global life functioning and disability. Further, though some 
have asserted that the deficits are largely the result of age (and subsequent psychomotor 
slowing), inpatient status, and comorbid psychological and medical conditions, the depressed 
individuals who participated in the present study were young (the average age for the group was 
26, with six individuals under the age of 23), ambulatory, medically healthy, carefully 
psychologically screened non-patients. Thus, these characteristics (age, severity, comorbidity) 
are unlikely to explain present results.  
Age may, however, partially explain the somewhat surprising result of increased 
impairment in working memory in the past but not currently depressed group. Though the 
average age of each group was not significantly different, the past depressed group contained 9 
individuals (22% of the group) over age 42, while the current depressed group contained only 2 
individuals over the age of 40 (also 22% of the group) and no individuals over age 42. Though 
controversial, previous research has suggested a relationship between the total number of 
depressive episodes experienced across the life-span and cognitive impairment (Beats, Sahakian, 
& Levy, 1996). Because the past depression group contained more middle-aged individuals, it 
may have also contained more individuals who have experienced multiple depressive episodes 
(purely as a result of having had more years of life in which to do so). Thus, this may explain 
why working memory was found to characterize past depression and not current depression. It is 
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also likely that, with only nine participants, the statistical power was simply too low to detect the 
importance of working memory in the currently depressed group. Alternatively, the working 
memory deficit may be a spurious result unrelated to a history of depression. Indeed, the 
symptom regression analyses support this explanation, as working memory was found to be 
negatively related to current anhedonic depression symptoms. Future research will have to 
clarify this relationship using larger samples.  
In agreement with previous research (Paradiso, Lamberty, Garvey, & Robinson, 1997), 
the results of the DDA are supportive of the assertion that executive function impairments persist 
even after a depressive episode has receded, as difficulties with shifting differentiated both 
current and past depression from anxiety and the lifelong absence of an Axis I disorder. Age-
appropriate norms were not available for the BRIEF. However, it is important to remember that 
while more impaired scores on the shifting subscale were shown to characterize current and past 
depression, the means for both groups (16.89 and 15.83, respectively, on a 30 point scale) 
suggest that neither group scored in a clinically impaired range. Thus, the deficit in shifting that 
characterizes current and past depression is likely subtle, perhaps exerting a negative effect on 
performance only in more complex real-world situations. This may explain the inconsistency that 
has resulted from studies relying solely on formal neuropsychological testing to examine 
executive function deficits, as such testing would likely miss this important difference in shifting 
ability.  
Importantly, the results of the DDA additionally suggest that a common deficit in 
emotional control characterizes anxiety, current depression, and past depression. Emotional 
control was also the only executive function deficit uniquely associated with impaired global 
functioning in regression analyses (i.e., above and beyond what could be attributed to current 
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anhedonic depression and anxiety symptoms). Thus, while the effects of impairment in shifting, 
planning and organizing, and working memory on functional disability appear to be largely 
mediated by current depressive and anxious symptoms, difficulty using cognitive processes to 
control emotional reactions may represent a more stable, and perhaps trait-like, predictor of 
affective disorders. Further, since the predictive ability of symptoms disappeared after 
accounting for impairment in emotional control, difficulty governing emotional reactions may 
mediate the relationship between symptoms and general disability, suggesting a point of 
divergence between isolated symptoms (which are high base-rate phenomena) and diagnosable 
psychopathology (which is not). Although emotional control was not predictive of depression or 
anxiety symptoms in the previously depressed group without co-morbid anxiety, this is likely 
due to the fact that current symptoms in this group were quite low. Indeed, follow-up analyses 
revealed that anhedonic depression and anxious apprehension symptoms in the previously 
depressed group without co-morbid anxiety were no different than those observed in participants 
without a current or previous Axis I diagnosis, t(27.46) = 1.45, p = .16, ns, equal variances not 
assumed and t(81) = 1.82, p = .07, ns, respectively.  
Surprisingly, problems with emotional control were associated with better global 
functioning in the currently depressed group. Given the small sample size of the currently 
depressed group, this seemingly contradictory result could be the result of sampling error. 
However, this result may also stem from the fact that only ahedonic depression was measured in 
the present study. As previous research has shown, melancholic depression (which is 
characterized by anhedonia, e.g., a lack of pleasurable response) is highly associated with 
impairment (Austin et al., 1999). Thus, a depressed person who retains the ability to feel 
emotions strongly and has a tendency toward emotional outbursts (which characterize impaired 
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emotional control) may be exhibiting less anhedonia and, therefore, would be expected to 
manifest improved functioning and reduced global impairment. However, impaired emotional 
control was associated with higher anhedonic depression symptoms in current depression (as 
well as anxiety), suggesting that the relationship between anhedonic depression, emotional 
control, and global functioning is even more complex, resulting, perhaps, from the improved 
interpersonal functioning that can accompany increased emotional expression in depressed 
individuals (Gurtman, 1987; Paddock & Nowicki, 1986).  
Interestingly, the results of the exploratory regression analyses suggest that in current and 
past depression difficulty shifting is related to anhedonic depression symptoms in opposing 
ways, with impairment associated with increased symptoms in the past depressed-only group but 
associated with decreased symptoms in the currently depressed group. This may be an artifact of 
the depression measure used in the present study, which, as described in the Methods section, 
was composed of a sub-selection of items from MASQ-AD scale that excluded items measuring 
positive affect. Low positive affect, however, has been specifically associated with impaired 
attentional set shifting (Compton, Wirtz, Pajoumand, Claus, & Heller, 2004). Further, if 
difficulties in shifting can be viewed as a defining feature of rumination, this result supports that 
of a recent meta-analysis that concluded that rumination predicts the onset of a major-depressive 
episode but appears unrelated to the duration of a depressive episode once it has begun (Nolen-
Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008).  
The present study has several important limitations. First, small sample size, particularly 
in the currently depressed group, limits the generalizability of the findings. Moreover, while 
DDA is suitable as long as the sample size of the smallest group is larger than the number of 
continuous variables under consideration (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), regression analyses 
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perform better with larger samples than those tested here. Therefore, the regression analyses in 
the present study should be considered preliminary and interpreted with particular caution. This 
is especially true of the group-level regression analyses, as noted above. Additionally, though 
medication usage was recorded by the experimenters, participants were, understandably, not 
always forthcoming about their use of psychotropic medications. Thus, data on psychotropic 
medication was largely incomplete and unsuitable for analysis. Non-medicated depressed 
patients show impairment across cognitive abilities, including attention, learning, memory, and 
executive function (Porter et al., 2003). However, certain kinds of anti-depressants (and other 
psychotropic drugs) are also known to cause executive function impairments (Schmitt et al., 
2001). Thus, medication status is an important, yet unmeasured, potential contributor to the 
results of the study. Thirdly, although the use of a self-report measure of everyday executive 
functions was intended to capture elements of executive dysfunction that go unnoticed in formal 
testing situations, due to self-report bias it may also have artificially inflated evidence of such 
dysfunction (Lahr, Beblo, & Hartje, 2007). Indeed, as has been recently shown, depressed 
individuals may be particularly poor at gauging their actual level of executive function 
impairment, at least when the results of formal testing are equated with their actual level of 
impairment (which, as described above, may a problematic assumption) (Naismith, Longley, 
Scott, & Hickie, 2007). Additionally, though the inclusion of the perceptual bias measurement 
had a strong theoretical rationale, it is likely that the usefulness of this information was 
substantially limited by the necessity of collapsing the “pure” depression groups into “mixed’ 
groups that also contained comorbid anxiety. Since anxious apprehension and depression are 
known to produce opposite patterns in the Chimeric Faces Task, creating groups equally mixed 
for both depression and anxiety symptoms, though acceptable for the DDA, likely cancelled out 
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any effect that could be discerned for the CFT using this analysis. Therefore, future research 
should re-examine the influence of perceptual biases/hemispheric asymmetries on executive 
function in unipolar depression using larger samples of anxiety free currently and previously 
depressed individuals. Lastly, as a correlational study employing a retrospective, cross-sectional 
design, it is impossible for the present research to discern the direction of causality between 
executive function impairments and unipolar depression. Indeed, as the literature has indicated, 
the relationship between unipolar depression, disability, deficits in executive function, age, 
physical health, cognitive style, and life-experience is unlikely to be simple or uni-directional. 
Although only prospective and experimental studies can definitively shed light on causal 
relationships, as the present study has demonstrated, future studies would do well to incorporate 
ecologically valid measurements of executive function as the deficits detected in the present 
study were typically sub-clinical in severity but still influenced global functioning, even more so 
in conjunction with elevated symptoms. Further, future studies would greatly benefit from using 
multivariate statistics. Supporting this, follow-up analyses revealed that, using the same dataset, 
an analysis strategy that relied exclusively upon multiple univariate ANOVAs would have 
completely missed the effects on both working memory and planning and organizing.  
In aggregate, the present study indicates that unipolar depression is associated with 
executive function impairments, specifically impairments in emotional control, shifting, and 
planning and organizing. These impairments may fall below clinical significance and, therefore, 
be difficult to detect in formal testing situations, yet they nevertheless predict current disability 
(as measured by GAF). However, only deficits in emotional control appear to do so in the 
absence of depressive and anxious symptoms. Thus, the relationship between symptoms and 
executive function deficits is complex. Although deficits in shifting seem to persist into the 
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remitted state of unipolar depression, they also appear to have opposite relationships to 
anhedonic depression symptoms depending on whether or not one is currently experiencing a 
major depressive episode. So, while some executive function deficits may resolve as symptoms 
abate, emotional control appears to be a more stable predictor of affective psychopathology (e.g., 
anxiety and depression). As executive function training is increasingly considered as an 
adjunctive treatment for psychological disorders (Watkins, 2009), emotional control appears to 
be a worthwhile, yet previously unstudied, target for intervention. 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Summary of BRIEF Subscales 
Scale   
# of 
items 
 Description of Ability  Example of Deficit 
Inhibit  13  stop behavior; delay impulses easily distracted; 
      act without thinking 
       
Shift  10  switch activities; think flexibly difficulty changing topic; 
      difficulty adapting 
       
Emotional  10  use of executive functions to  emotional outbursts; 
Control     regulate emotions  over-reactivity  
       
Monitor  5  track effect of behavior on  thoughtlessness; 
    Others  inconsiderateness 
       
Working 12  hold information temporarily  inability to follow directions; 
Memory    in mind  forgetfulness  
       
Plan/  13  anticipate events & complete  not allowing enough time; 
Organize    steps needed for future goals  overwhelmed by large tasks 
       
Organization  7  keep workspace &   frequent loss of items; 
of Materials    livingspace organized  messiness 
       
Task  10  finish tasks in timely manner;  missing deadlines; 
 Completion       complete tasks correctly   making numerous errors 
 
Note. BRIEF = Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function 
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Table 2  
Demographic Characteristics 
  
          
  pMDE  cMDE  Anxiety  Control   Total  
Characteristic   (n = 41)   (n = 9)   (n = 30)   (n = 62)   (N =142) 
Age (in years)           
M  32.51  26.11  30.23  27.5  29.44 
SD  10.51  10.12  11.08  10.08  10.57 
Gender (%)           
Male  29.27  11.11  13.33  51.61  34.51 
Female   70.73   88.89   86.67   48.39   65.49 
 
Note. pMDE = past depression group, cMDE = current depression group, anxiety = anxiety 
group, and control = comparison group with no diagnoses  
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Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics 
  
          
 pMDE  cMDE  Anxiety  Control   Total  
Measure M(SD)   M(SD)   M(SD)   M(SD)   M(SD) 
1. GAF 77.39(9.96)  65.89(9.14)  76.23(10.00)  86.73(5.38)  80.49(10.17) 
2. Inhibit 16.85(2.61)  18.11(2.89)  17.20(2.28)  17.15(2.96)  17.13(2.71) 
3. Shift 15.63(3.77)  16.89(4.01)  15.87(2.79)  13.90(2.97)  15.00(3.38) 
4. Emco 15.46(4.28)  19.78(6.01)  16.43(4.38)  13.19(3.00)  14.95(4.30) 
5. Monitor 6.63(1.62)  7.33(1.58)  6.40(1.77)  6.00(1.25)  6.35(1.54) 
6. Wkmem 17.41(3.80)  16.89(2.52)  17.17(3.32)  15.90(2.87)  16.67(3.28) 
7. PlanOrg 18.05(3.29)  21.89(6.29)  18.70(3.91)  17.95(3.67)  18.39(3.90) 
8. OrgMat 10.10(2.58)  9.89(2.15)  9.77(2.42)  9.95(1.87)  9.95(2.21) 
9. BRI 54.59(10.21) 
 
62.11(10.60) 
 
55.90(7.75) 
 
50.24(7.86) 
 
53.44(9.27) 
10. MCI 59.73(10.61) 
 
64.78(12.16) 
 
59.17(9.80) 
 
57.08(8.91) 
 
58.77(9.91) 
11. GEC 114.32(18.66) 
 
126.89(21.02) 
 
115.07(15.20) 
 
107.32(15.02) 
 
112.22(17.21) 
12. PSWQ 48.61(13.12) 
 
53.11(22.00) 
 
51.30(12.11) 
 
39.98(13.96) 
 
45.70(14.76) 
13. MASQ-AA 21.90(3.51) 
 
29.00(7.82) 
 
23.03(4.82) 
 
22.50(4.58) 
 
22.85(4.85) 
14. MASQ-AD8 15.37(4.55) 
 
22.44(5.70) 
 
13.93(3.18) 
 
13.51(3.44) 
 
14.70(4.43) 
15. CFT -0.41(0.45)  -0.36(0.58)  -0.60(0.36)  -0.52(0.33)  -0.50(0.40) 
 
Note. pMDE = past major depressive episode; cMDE = current major depressive episode; GAF = 
Global Assessment of Functioning; Emco = Emotional Control; Wkmem = Working Memory; 
PlanOrg = Plan/Organization; OrgMat = Organization of Materials; BRI = Behavior Regulation 
Index; MCI = Metacognition Index; GEC = Global Executive Composite; PSWQ = Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire; MASQ-AA = Anxious Arousal subscale of Mood and Anxiety Symptoms 
Questionnaire; MASQ-AD8 = Loss of Interest items on Anhedonic Depression subscale of the 
Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire; and CFT = Chimeric Faces Task 
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Table 4 
Correlations Among the Variables, pMDE vs cMDE 
            
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. GAF (+) -.01 -.08 .24 -.10 -.24 .05 -.06 -.15 -.07 -.12 -.17 -.25 -.09 -.06 
2. Inhibit -.14 (+) .61* .45* .59* .42* .53* .30 .76* .48* .69* .24 .13 .13 .03 
3. Shift .22 .50 (+) .68* .47* .44* .68* .24 .88* .57* .81* .50* .46* .46* -.10 
4. Emco .32 -.01 .50 (+) .55* .44* .45* .26 .87* .45* .73* .60* .38 .38 -.14 
5. Monitor -.49 .54 .52 .11 (+) .43* .59* .32 .71* .53* .69* .23 .15 .20 -.04 
6. Wkmem .06 -.19 .53 .61 -.02 (+) .56* .53* .52* .86* .77* .33 .19 .06 .16 
7. PlanOrg -.21 .49 .78 .10 .77 .27 (+) .49* .67* .83* .83* .34 .32 .37 .03 
8. OrgMat -.01 .32 .59 .38 .45 .16 .65 (+) .32 .75* .60* .19 -.15 .17 .27 
9. BRI .16 .54 .88* .77 .56 .49 .60 .59 (+) .61* .89* .53* .39 .39 -.09 
10. MCI -.11 .53 .87* .23 .67 .44 .97* .66 .70 (+) .90* .31 .12 .22 .23 
11. GEC .02 .58 .95* .52 .67 .50 .86* .68* .91* .93* (+) .47* .28 .34 .08 
12. PSWQ .14 -.05 .32 .70 -.03 .46 .03 .66 .50 .18 .35 (+) .35 .39 -.16 
13. AA -.33 -.09 .38 .61 .03 .30 .15 .66 .47 .18 .34 .68 (+) .59* -.13 
14. AD8 -.33 .16 .19 .39 .68 .04 .44 .57 .44 .39 .45 .40 .14 (+) -.28 
15. CFT .22 -.60 -.25 .50 -.27 .13 -.57 -.29 -.01 .57 -.34 .22 .37 -.05 (+) 
  
Note. Past depression group is above the diagonal, and current depression group is below the 
diagonal; GAF = Global Assessment of Functioning; Emco = Emotional Control subscale; 
Wkmem = Working Memory subscale; PlanOrg = Plan/Organization subscale; OrgMat = 
Organization of Materials subscale; BRI = Behavior Regulation Index; MCI = Metacognition 
Index; GEC = Global Executive Composite; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; AA = 
Anxious Arousal subscale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire; AD8 = the Loss 
of Interest items on the Anhedonic Depression subscale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom 
Questionnaire; and CFT = Chimeric Faces Task 
*p < .01 (2-tailed).  
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Table 5  
Correlations Among the Variables, Anxiety vs Control 
            
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. GAF (+) -.24 .09 -.47* -.18 -.12 .06 -.16 -.34 -.07 -.22 -.40 -.22 -.16 -.04 
2. Inhb -.08 (+) -.01 .26 .46 .21 .42 .26 .53* .38 .51* -.19 -.03 .13 -.22 
3. Shift -.07 .39* (+) .38 .31 .30 .36 .04 .63* .39 .57* .27 .22 .33 .16 
4. Emco -.11 .51* .49* (+) .28 .23 .23 .27 .84* .34 .65* .37 .19 .52* .04 
5. Montr -.04 .52* .38* .30 (+) .10 .37 -.05 .63* .22 .46* .12 -.03 .18 -.26 
6. Wkmem -.12 .60* .39* .44* .42* (+) .47* .33 .32 .78* .66* .08 .56* .43 -.28 
7. PlanOrg -.09 .36* .43* .33* .35* .56* (+) .30 .47* .85* .79* -.35 .13 .64* -.30 
8. OrgMat -.01 .41* .28 .34* .18 .43* .53* (+) .23 .60* .50* -.09 .09 .07 -.15 
9. BRI -.10 .80* .78* .81* .61* .61* .48* .42* (+) .49* .83* .28 .17 .49* -.04 
10. MCI -.05 .48* .48* .45* .43* .77* .90* .65* .60* (+) .90* -.18 .33 .59* -.31 
11. GEC -.08 .70* .69* .69* .58* .78* .79* .60* .88* .91* (+) .03 .30 .63* -.22 
12. PSWQ -.03 .04 .27 .30* .04 .10 .02 -.04 .24 .03 .14 (+) .33 -.03 .16 
13. AA -.07 .24 .25 .04 .18 .19 .04 .13 .23 .12 .19 .13 (+) .40 -.14 
14. AD8 -.02 -.02 .29 .06 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.03 .12 -.01 .06 .38* .29* (+) -.12 
15. CFT -.30 .03 .01 -.02 .03 .06 -.08 -.18 .01 -.11 -.06 -.06 -.12 .13 (+) 
 
Note. The anxiety group is above the diagonal, and the control group is below the diagonal; GAF 
= Global Assessment of Functioning; Inhb = Inhibit subscale; Emco = Emotional Control 
subscale; Montr = Monitor subscale; Wkmem = Working Memory subscale; PlanOrg = 
Plan/Organization subscale; OrgMat = Organization of Materials subscale; BRI = Behavior 
Regulation Index; MCI = Metacognition Index; GEC = Global Executive Composite; PSWQ = 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire; AA = Anxious Arousal subscale of the Mood and Anxiety 
Symptoms Questionnaire; AD8 = the Loss of Interest items on the Anhedonic Depression 
subscale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire; and CFT = Chimeric Faces Task 
*p < .01 (2-tailed).  
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Table 6 
Correlations Among the Variables, Total Sample 
               
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. GAF (+)               
2. Inhibit -.10 (+)              
3. Shift -.19 .39* (+)             
4. EmoC -.41* .36* .58* (+)            
5. Monitor -.24* .51* .44* .41* (+)           
6. Wkmem -.23* .40* .43* .41* .34* (+)          
7. PlanOrg -.12 .43* .53* .35* .47* .48* (+)         
8. OrgMat -.05 .32* .22* .26* .18 .43* .44* (+)        
9. BRI -.33* .68* .82* .85* .66* .52* .56* .32* (+)       
10. MCI -.17 .46* .55* .43* .45* .78* .86* .66* .61* (+)      
11. GEC -.27* .63* .76* .71* .62* .73* .80* .55* .89* .90* (+)     
12. PSWQ -.30* .05 .41* .52* .17 .24* .06 .08 .43* .14 .32* (+)    
13. AA -.22* .16 .32* .31* .14 .25* .20 .08 .33* .21* .30* .30* (+)   
14. AD8 -.31* .09 .39* .41* .24* .13 .34* .10 .40* .28* .38* .36* .43* (+)  
15. CFT -.11 -.07 -.01 -.04 -.05 .05 -.14 .00 -.02 -.05 -.04 -.00 -.03 -.02 (+) 
 
Note. GAF = Global Assessment of Functioning; Inhb = Inhibit subscale; Emco = Emotional 
Control subscale; Montr = Monitor subscale; Wkmem = Working Memory subscale; PlanOrg = 
Plan/Organization subscale; OrgMat = Organization of Materials subscale; BRI = Behavior 
Regulation Index; MCI = Metacognition Index; GEC = Global Executive Composite; PSWQ = 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire; AA = Anxious Arousal subscale of the Mood and Anxiety 
Symptoms Questionnaire; AD8 = the Loss of Interest items on the Anhedonic Depression 
subscale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire; and CFT = Chimeric Faces Task 
*p < .01 (2-tailed).  
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Table 7  
Wilks's Lambda and Canonical Correlations for Diagnostic Groups 
             
Function   Wilks's     df   p   Rc   R
2
c 
1 to 3  .534  85.908  21  .000  .544  29.59% 
2 to 3  .759  38.385  12  .000  .422  17.81% 
3   .924   10.754   5   .056   .276   7.62% 
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Table 8 
Standardized Discriminant Function and Structure Coefficients 
  Function  Structure   
Measure   Coefficient   Coefficient (rs)   r
2
s 
Function 1       
Shift  -.340  .303  9.18% 
Emco  .537  .581  33.76% 
Wkmem  -.309  .081  0.656% 
PlanOrg  .313  .381  14.51% 
PSWQ  -.070  .302  9.12% 
MASQ-AA  .342  .534  28.52% 
MASQ-AD8  .631  .833  69.39% 
       
Function 2       
Shift  .477  .520  27.04% 
Emco  .178  .570  32.49% 
Wkmem  .504  .447  19.98% 
PlanOrg  -.505  -.002  0.00% 
PSWQ  .465  .656  43.03% 
MASQ-AA  -.605  -.169  2.86% 
MASQ-AD8  .104  .177  3.13% 
       
Function 3       
Shift  -.131  .171  2.92% 
Emco  .472  .388  15.10% 
Wkmem  -.556  -.018  0.03% 
PlanOrg  .603  .198  3.92% 
PSWQ  .450  .345  11.90% 
MASQ-AA  .462  .255  6.50% 
MASQ-AD8   -.964   -.453   20.52% 
  
Note. Emco = Emotional Control; Wkmem = Working Memory; PlanOrg = Planning/Organization; 
PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; MASQ-AA = Anxious Arousal subscale of MASQ; MASQ-
AD8 = the Loss of Interest items on Anhedonic Depression subscale of MASQ 
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Table 9  
Group Centroids 
Group   Function 1  Function 2  Function 3 
pMDE  -.074  .515  -.309 
cMDE  2.422  -.286  -.036 
Anxiety  -.046  .372  .497 
Control   -.280   -.479   -.030 
 
Note. pMDE = past depression group, cMDE = current depression group, Anxiety = anxiety 
group, and Control = comparison group with no current or past diagnoses  
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Table 10 
Summary of DDA Results 
Measure   pMDE  cMDE  Anxiety 
MASQ-AD8  +
2
  +
1
  - 
PSWQ  +
3
  +
1
  +
2
 
MASQ-AA    +   
Emco  +
3
  +
1
  +
2
 
Shift  +
2
  +
1
   
Wkmem  +     
Plan/Org       +     
 
Note. pMDE = past depression group, cMDE = current depression group, and Anxiety = anxiety 
group; + = elevated symptoms or increased impairment; - = lower symptoms or decreased 
impairment; where a single measure characterized multiple groups, the superscript represents the 
rank of the group mean compared to the mean score of other groups, with lower numbers 
indicating a higher mean score  
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Table 11 
Regression Analyses Predicting GAF (N = 142) 
       
    Variable β t ∆R2 F 
Emotional Control      
Step 1  Emco -.41 -5.31*** .17*** F(1,140) = 28.20*** 
Step 2     .03 F(3,138) = 11.30*** 
   Emco -.30 -3.22**   
   MASQ_AD8 -.15 -1.76   
   PSWQ -.10 -1.04   
Shifting        
Step 1  Shift -.189 -2.28* .04* F(1,140) = 5.20* 
Step 2     .14*** F(3,138) = 7.30*** 
   Shift -.01 -0.12   
   MASQ_AD8 -.22 -2.51*   
   PSWQ -.22 -2.47*   
Planning/Organizing      
Step 1  PlanOrg -.12 -1.46 .02 F(1,140) = 2.14 
Step 2     .14*** F(3,138) = 7.38*** 
   PlanOrg -.04 -0.46   
   MASQ_AD8 -.21 -2.35*   
   PSWQ -.23 -2.67**   
Working Memory       
Step 1  Wkmem -.23 -2.75** .05** F(1,140) = 7.54** 
Step 2     .16*** F(3,138) = 8.67*** 
   Wkmem -.15 -1.89   
   MASQ_AD8 -.22 -2.60*   
      PSWQ -.19 -2.23*   
        
Note. ∆R2 = percent variance accounted for at each step; GAF = Global Assessment of 
Functioning; Emco = Emotional Control; PlanOrg = Planning/Organization; Wkmem = Working 
Memory; MASQ-AD8 = Loss of Interest Items of MASQ; PSWQ = Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.  
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Table 12  
Regression Analyses Predicting GAF, Anxiety Group Only (N = 30) 
       
    Variable β t ∆R2 F 
Emotional Control      
Step 1  Emco -0.47 -2.78* .27* F(1,28) = 7.70* 
Step 2     .06 F(3,26) = 3.29* 
   Emco -0.39 -1.80^   
   MASQ_AD8 0.04 0.20   
   PSWQ -0.25 -1.34   
 
Note. ∆R2 represents percent variance accounted for at each step; GAF = Global Assessment of 
Functioning; Emco = Emotional Control; MASQ-AD8 = Loss of Interest Items, Anhedonic 
Depression Subscale of MASQ; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire. ^p < .10; *p < .05.  
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Table 13  
Regression Analyses Predicting GAF, Current Depression Group Only (N = 9) 
       
    Variable β t ∆R2 F 
Emotional Control      
Step 1  Emco 0.32 0.91 .11 F(1,7) = 0.82 
Step 2     .25 F(3,5) = 0.91 
   Emco 0.55 1.09   
   MASQ_AD8 -0.54 -1.35   
   PSWQ -0.03 -0.05   
 Step 3     .47* F(4,4) = 4.69^ 
   Emco 0.80 2.61^   
   MASQ_AD8 -2.10 -3.95   
   PSWQ -3.61 -3.18   
      Intx 4.33 3.27*     
 
Note. ∆R2 represents percent variance accounted for at each step; GAF = Global Assessment of 
Functioning; Emco = Emotional Control; MASQ-AD8 = Loss of Interest Items, Anhedonic 
Depression Subscale of MASQ; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; Intx = the interaction 
of PSWQ and the MASQ_AD8. ^p < .10; *p < .05.  
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Table 14  
Regression Analyses Predicting GAF, Past Depression Only (No Anxiety) (N = 21) 
      
    Variable β t ∆R2 F 
Emotional Control      
Step 1  Emco -0.41 -1.96^ .17^ F(1,19) = 3.85^ 
Step 2     .02 F(3,17) = 1.33 
   Emco -0.46 -1.99^   
   MASQ_AD8 -0.03 -0.12   
   PSWQ 0.16 0.67   
 
Note. ∆R2 represents percent variance accounted for at each step; GAF = Global Assessment of 
Functioning; Emco = Emotional Control; MASQ-AD8 = Loss of Interest Items, Anhedonic 
Depression Subscale of MASQ; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; Intx = the interaction 
of PSWQ and the MASQ_AD8. ^p < .10. 
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